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What Light Is Cast by History on the
Nature of Equity in Modern Law?*
By RALPH A. NEwm i*
HOLMES saw law as an eternal procession.' History, Cardozo has
said, illuminates the present by a study of the past, and so points
the way to the future.2 1 know of no area of law in which these state-
ments are more truly applicable than that part of the law which we
call by the name of equity Equity, which is probably the most in-
portant element of law, is without doubt the element which is least
understood. This uncertainty as to the nature of equity arises from the
fact that it plays a strange role in our jurisprudence; separate from,
and yet a part of law; and from the fact that equity is a protagonist in
the unending conflict between the goal of certainty, which is so
essential to the impartial admimstration of law, and the goal of ideal
justice.
Equity has been dealt with in various ways in different legal sys-
tems. In Roman law the principles of equity provided a system of law
which was acceptable to inhabitants of different nations because it
was based on fundamental impulses of human nature which are com-
mon to all peoples. Roman equity, as Ehrlich has put it, "selected those
elements which are uiversally human, and which must exist in every
society ,,3 This body of law, which was called the tus gentium, was ad-
* This paper was the basis of a talk delivered at the annual meeting of the Pacific
Branch of the American Society for Legal History at Sacramento, Califorma on Septem-
ber 22, 1965.
** Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law. Professor Newman is a past
President of the American Society for Legal History.
I See Horu~is, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPEns 194-95
( 1920). "Our only interest in the past is for the light it throws upon the present."
See also Hor~mzs, Law in Science and Science in Law, in CoLLEcr LEGAL PAPE1 s
225 (1920) "History sets us free and enables us to make up our minds dispassion-
ately whether the survival of what we are enforcing answers any new purpose when it
has ceased to answer the old."2 CAnozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, in SELEcTED Wrm=s 128 (1921).
The exact statement is as follows: "History, in illuminating the past, illuminates the
present, and in illuminating the present, illuminates the future Today we study
the day before yesterday, in order that yesterday may not paralyze today, and today may
not paralyze tomorrow."
I EmuLicE, PaNcipr.LEs oF THE SocIoLoGY OF LAw 298 (1962 ed.). The same thought
has been expressed by Wiirzel in DAs Jussvscir DENKEN § 26 (1904), where he refers
to "the concepts, relatively few in number, which embody directly the phenomena of
social life as they would appear if there were no laws."
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minstered in the court of the praetor peregrmus as a separate legal
system. The principles were expanded and developed in the course of
experience in their use, exactly as was to occur much later on in En-
gland and in the United States; and early m the second century, in
the reign of Hadnan, they were incorporated by imperial decree
into the corpus surts itself.4
Between the twelfth and the eighteenth centuries many countries
of Europe fell heir to a system of Roman law in which equity had been
completely fused into the main body of the law" The civil law systems
which succeeded to Roman law have dealt with equity by ignoring it
as a distinct element of law ( Tis solution has not been completely
successful because there are many areas of civil law in which the prin-
ciples of equity have become lost and have ceased to perform their
function as a creative force which animates the life of the law 7
In England, as was the case in early Roman law, equity has been
dealt with as a separate system for more than five hundred years. This
has been due to a variety of causes. By the end of the thirteenth cen-
tury the common law had become .permeated with dry rot." Form and
tradition, rather than the desire to do justice, controlled. Common law
procedure had become a black art, in which the true ends of law had
become lost.9 Throughout the world, since the dawn of conscience,o
relief from hardslp caused in special cases by the operation of the
rules of strict law was granted by the king; we see an early example
of this in Solomon's prayer for an understanding heart to judge his
people, rather than for knowledge of the law 11 In England such relief
4 Shortly before 129 A.D. See LENEL, DAS EDacTm PEnPETOum (3d ed. 1927);
Pnngsheun, The Legal Policy and the Reforms of Hadrian, 24 J. RoMAN STUDIS 141,
143 (1934).
5 The Corpus Iurts of Justiman did not penetrate into France until the tvelftha
century, continuing until 1804; see CoLIn & CAPrrANT, TRArri -r. MENT RE DE DRorr
cIvix. No. 18 (8th ed. 1935). In Germany the acceptance commenced in the thirteenth
century and continued until the eighteenth; see AMos & WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO
FRENCH LAw 13 (1936).
6 "A civilian cannot understand what American conparatists mean when they
say that 'in Anglo-American law Equity has failed to merge into the general body of
law, as occurred in all other surviving legal systems." Razi, Reflections on Equity in the
Civil Law Systems, 13 AM. U.L. REv. 24 (1963).
7 Puig Brutau, Juidical Evolution and Equity, in EssAYs IN JRISPRJDENcE IxN
HONOR OF RoscoE PoUN 82, 84 (1962). Professor Simpson, in "Equity in 1946," 1946
Am. SuRvEy Am. L. 1, says that "to survey equity is to look at the most creative and
vital aspect of the judicial process."
8 Pound, "Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?" 5 COLum. L. REV. 639, 650 (1905).
9 9 HoLswoRT, HISTORY OF ENGmH LAw 393 (1932).
10 The expression is taken from BnEnAsD, THE DAWN OF CoNscm cE.
11 1 Kings 3:9.
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came to be administered by the royal Chancellor, who in the middle
of the fourteenth century set up his own court. To avoid conflicts with
the established courts, jealous of their jurisdiction and prerogatives,"2
the Chancellor limited his remedies to orders addressed to the litigants
commanding their personal action, a form of remedy winch the com-
mon law courts felt themselves powerless to grant. This form of rem-
edy, and the substantive principles of law which were applied by the
Chancellor, were based on doctrines of the canon law, with which
the chancellors by reason of their ecclesiastical background were thor-
oughly familiar.13 These doctrines were applied only in the Court of
Chancery, since the common law judges were reluctant to accept the
humane doctrines winch were applied on the other side of Westminster
Hall. There is a touch of irony in the practice of Coke, while he was
Lord Chancellor, of kneeling, on his way to the woolsack, before his
father, who was Chief Judge of the Court of King's Bench, to ask his
blessing. "Treasonl That's quartering!" said Jerry in Dickens' Tale of
Two Cities. "It is the law" replied the ancient clerk, turning his sur-
prised spectacles upon him. "It is the law Leave the law to take
care of itself." The common law judges walked scrupulously m the
ancient ways, and left to the Chancellor the responsibility for the hu-
mane administration of law in accordance with elementary principles
of justice.
More than a hundred years ago in England, and even earlier in
the United States, efforts were begun to humanize the main body of the
law by abolishing the separate courts of equity This procedural solu-
tion, as is admitted by Judge Holtzoff14 and most other authorities on
procedure except the late Judge Clark, has failed to bring about a
fusion of the the substantive principles of equity with the main body
of the law The principles of equity are still largely confined to cases in
which one of the litigants is entitled to specific or "equitable" relief,
12 See KERLY, HIsToRY OF EQurrY ch. 4 (1890).
13 "Every Chancellor from 1380 to 1488 was a clerk." Scrutton, Roman Law In-
fluence tn Chancery, Church Courts, Admiralty, and Law Merchant, in Smcr EssAYs
oN ANGLO-AmEICAN LEGAL HiSTony 215 (1907). The Great Seal was held by laymen
only for about twelve years during the fourteenth century. Holland, Some Early Chancel-
lors, 9 Caism. L.J. 17, 23 (1945).
14 BARoN & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcmCiE § 141 (1950) "The change is
one of procedure rather than remedy. The substantive distinctions between equitable
and legal remedies have not been erased. Only procedural distinctions have been
abolished. The substantive principles of equity for balancing rights and obligations
are not superseded. The rules have not changed the principles which guide
the courts in granting or refusing injunctive relief." Walsh, Is Equity Decadent?,
in 22 MiiN. L. REv. 479, 489 (1938), says that "equitable defenses do not become legal
defenses under Code merger."
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and most of the cases which come before our courts, those in which
the plaintiff is entitled only to damages, are decided without the ben-
efit of the elevated moral principles which constitute the supreme con-
tribution of a long line of distinguished chancellors to a humane ad-
Imstration of justice.
What are these principles? In what respects are they different from
the principles which are applied in most legal actions? To answer
these questions we must turn back, again, the pages of history, even
to those which antedate Roman law The origin of equity is usually
traced back to Aristotle, who defined epteikeuz as the correction of
law when the law is imperfect owing to its universality 15 Aristotle's
definition was perfectly correct in the context of his place and time.
Early law was thought of as exactly defined rules for exactly defined
facts."' Change in the law was difficult, and relief in cases of hard-
ship must come from sources outside the law itself. Aristotle accord-
ingly thought of equity as the correction of the inadequacies of law;
but centuries earlier another great thinker who was a prophet, dream-
mg under the stars in the clear night of the middle east, conceived of
a system of law in which justice was identified with charity and
brotherhood. In the words of the great unknown Isaiah, when right-
eousness cannot enter, justice stands afar off.17 There is a close lin-
guistic relationship between the Hebrew word nekohah (righteous-
ness) which is translated in the King James bible as "equity," the
Greek word epzeikewa, which we translate as "equity" but which liter-
ally means clemency, the French word clemence, and the English word
"compassion." In the course of time the doctrines of equity have taken
form in Anglo-American jurisprudence in a number of specific prin-
ciples; but these principles can always be reduced to a common de-
nominator of good faith, of sharing the burdens of misfortune arising
out of human relationships, and of deciding controversies not on the
basis of general rules for ordinary situations but according to the facts
of each case. Celsus defined law as "ars born et aequi," 8 which Max
Radin has beautifully translated as "the art of equity" But the purpose
of all law is to do what is fair and just.'9 As Lord Evershed has said,
15 AIsTOTLE, NicHOmAcHEAN E mcs Bk. 5, ch. 10.
16Pound, Introduction to NEwMAN, EQUITY AND LAw" A COmPAPATIVE STUDY
10 (1962).
17 Isatah 59:14.
1 8 CELSUS, DIGEST 1.1.1.
19 See RiPERT, LA PJGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVInES No. 32 (4th ed.
1949)" "Le droit n'est que l'analyse de ce qu est 6quitable et bon" (The law is only the
analysis of that wich is equitable and good). Contra, FiEUEmANN, LEGAL THEORY 344
(4th ed. 1960) equity "means nothing else but the application of considerations of
fairness and ]ustice against the letter of the law."
[Vol. 17THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL.
the principles of equity "illustrate, nay illuminate, but never precisely
define, the concept which lies behind, understood but unexpressed." 0
If I may be permitted to suggest a definition of what might be called
pure equity as dismguished from equity in the general sense of what
is fair and just, equity may be described as a force which gives shape
to the ideal of decent and honorable conduct in the relations of man
with man.
But what is the role of equity, now that law has become humanized,
in modern times? Does equity disappear, as seems to have been the
case in civil law, or does it continue to perform a useful function? The-
continuing need for equity in all legal systems arises out of the lag
between law and morals, due to the unending conflict between the
objectives of certainty and ideal justice. For most of legal history law
has been satisfied with what Jellinek has called a inmmium ethic. 2' A
Persian king said that the Greek market was a place where men might
cheat one another under oath. In all social disciplines except the law-
ethics, morals, government and religion-the requirements of complete
honesty, of sharing the burdens of misfortune, and of adjusting con- -
flicting interests according to the facts of each case, are accepted as
axiomatic. Only in our inner common law system are such require-
ments of human decency disregarded. Selling a termite-ridden house
without disclosing the facts22 Is cheating in all social disciplines except
the law Insistence on the strict terms of a contract which will rum
one of the parties and his family23 is condemned in all systems of social
20 Lecture at the Faculty of Law of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, p. 17
(1954).
21 DIE SozxLL-mmScHE BEDEuTuN VON REcHT, UN RE=E UND STRAFE 45 (1908
ed.).
2 2 Hendrick v. Lynn, 144 A.2d 147, 150 (Del. ch. 1958); Fegeas v. Sherrill, 218
Md. 472, 147 A.2d 223 (1958); Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, 311 Mass.
677, 42 N.E.2d 808 (1942).
2 3 Siegelman v. Cunard White Star S.S. Co., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955) (contract
of carnage provided that suits must be brought within one year, and that English
law governed the contract; carrier advised passenger that there would be no need
to bring action within the one-year period, then argued successfully that under English
law the time limitation had not thereby been waived); Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, 226
Ill. 9, 80 N.E. 564 (1907) (mistake in addition by seller; relief denied, because seller
was said to have been negligent); Streich v. General Motors Corp., 5 IMI. App. 2d
485, 126 N.E.2d 389 (1955) (long contract in fine prnt contained provision nullifying
any obligation on the part of the corporation; mistake in construing contract held no
basis for relief).
There is no warranty of the condition of the premises in sales of real property
4 WmLLISTON, CoNTRAcrs § 926 (rev. ed. 1936). See also Tetenman v. Epstein, 66
Cal. App. 745 (1924), wherein a suit was instituted to rescind a deed given to the
holder of a mortgage in payment of the debt. The deed was given in ignorance of the
existence of oil which had been discovered in the vicinity of the property, maang the
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control except the law Application of rules of conduct designed for
ordinary situations is not required when different circumstances are
present, except m law; for example, where a contract has been made
by mistake,24 or where the basic purposeof one of the parties has been
thwarted by unexpected future events. It is ludicrous to think that
cases should be decided according to different moral standards de-
pending on whether the plaintiff seeks specific performance or an
injunction, or only damages; yet the force of custom, "light as air,
yet strong as links of iron," still imposes a double moral standard in our
courts of law 26
Plato tells of a conversation between Socrates and Glaucon con-
cerinng the nature of justice. "The time has arrived, Glaucon," Socrates
says, "when like huntsmen, we should surround the cover and look
sharp that justice does not slip away, and pass out of sight, and get
lost; for there can be no doubt that we are in the right direction. Only
try to get a sight of her, and if you come within view first, let me
know " 27 Equity, like justice, is one of the ghosts of the law, elusive to
the grasp. The recognition of our common humanity is the greatest
property worth five times as much as before. The deed was upheld, since the mistake
was only as to the value of the property.24 Hubbert v. Fagan, 99 Ark. 480, 138 S.W 1001 (1911); Mansell v. Lord Lumber
& Fuel Co., 348 IIl. 140, 180 N.E. 774 (1932); Stemmeyer v. Schroeppel, supra note
23; Olsen v. Shepard, 165 Minn. 433, 206 N.W 711 (1926) (mistake in boundaries; relief
denied to mistaken party); Kennedy v. Mail Co., L.R. 2 Q.B. 580 (1871) (shares is-
sued to enable the defendant corporation to perform a contract for mail service with the
government of New Zealand; the purported contract was invalid, and this reduced the
value of the shares; relief was demed to the shareholder).2 5 Albert D. Gaon & Co. v. Soci6t6 Interprofessionelle des Ol6agineux Fluides
Alimentaires, 3 Weekly L2R. 622 (1959) (closing of the Suez Canal in 1956-57, al-
though increasing the cost of freightage between The Sudan and Nice nearly five times,
held not to justify rescission of a contract for ocean shipment). Hawke's Bay Electric-
Power Board v. Thomas Borthwick and Sons, Ltd., [1933] N.Z.L.R. 873 (premises
damaged by earthquake while a five-year lease still had more than two years to run,
and the damage necessitated ten months of expensive repairs; contract held not dis-
charged).
26 The double moral standard is endorsed in RESTATEMENT, CoNTPAcvs § 367
(1932), which provides as follows:
"Specific performance of a contract may be refused, if
(a) the consideration for it is grossly inadequate or its terms are otherwise unfair, or
(b) its enforcement will cause unreasonable or disproportionate hardship or loss
to the defendant or to third persons, or
(c) it was induced by some sharp practice, misrepresentation or mistake."
Comment a states that "even though the plaintiff's conduct has not been such as to
cause a court to refuse hun a judgment for damages or even such as to entitle hun to
any affirmative remedy against him, it may be such as to disentitle him to the remedy of
specific performance."2 7 PL&TO, REPuBrac, Bk. iv. 431.
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social revolution of our time. If the equity of all human laws is to be
related to the common principle of human brotherhood, we must rec-
ogmze that law no longer requires correction from without, but that
equity is an integral part of justice. Only then can the law fulfill its
function, in Lord Radcliffe's words, of nourishing and enriching the
growth of the human spirit.28 The age of the prophets has gone, and
"other souls sweep shadow-like around";29 but there are still the stars
under which to dream.
28 RADncu, THE LAw AND ITS Conp.ss 65 (1960).
2 9 HomER, ODYSSEY, Bk. x, at 122 (Butcher & Lang transl. 1924).

